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In transaction cost economics, trust has been treated as redundant or 
even misleading. This study tested the effects of governance and trust 
on the risk perceived by agents of firms in alliances. Two dimensions of 
relational risk were assessed: the probability that something will go 
wrong and the size of the loss incurred when it does. Hypotheses, tested 
with survey data on the customer relations of ten suppliers of electrical1 
electronic components, were well corroborated, with trust-related vari- 
ables as well as others found to have significant effects. 
Widespread competition in world markets, the increasing importance of 
fixed costs (Ohmae, 1989), rapid technological development, and the rising 
complexity of input and output markets (Zuscovitch, 1994), have made mar- 
ket competition increasingly like a race. To have a chance of winning this 
race, firms must concentrate on their core competencies (Prahalad & Hamel, 
1990). To do this, they need alliances with other firms that allow them (1)to 
share fixed costs (of, for instance, R&D, production, and distribution and 
sales), (2) to share the risks of development, (3) to enhance their own core 
competencies, (4) to acquire access to complementary competencies (Porter 
& Fuller, 1986), and (5) to increase speed of market entry (Lei & Slocum, 
1991). Hence, the design and implementation of alliances are vital. Early 
researchers paid much attention to the control of alliances, in order to cover 
the risks involved in cooperation between firms with different objectives; 
more recent researchers have found that excessive concern with control can 
be counterproductive (Lorange & Roos, 1992), that the management of alli- 
ances is critically concerned with attitudes and interpersonal relationships 
(Faulkner, 1995), and that attention should be paid to issues of trust (Barber, 
1983; Killing, 1988; Lorenz, 1988; Palay, 1984). The purpose of the reported 
study was to extend that line of research. 
This report is a product of a research project sponsored by the Economics Research Foun- 
dation, which is part of the Netherlands' Organization for Scientific Research. A grant from the 
European Science Foundation sponsored presentation of the article at a workshop in the pro- 
gram "European Management and Organization in Transition." 
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"Alliance" is a broad term capturing many forms of interfirm coopera- 
tion that go beyond market tranactions. Explanations of alliances in the 
literature focus on the trade-off between the perceived advantages of full 
ownership, market contracts, and intermediate positions (Contractor & Lor-
ange, 1988; Hagedoorn, 1993; Osborn & Baughn, 1990). Prominent ap- 
proaches to the systematic comparison of the various forms that interfirm 
alliances can take (such as long-term purchasing agreements, licensing, col- 
laboration on R&D, technology exchange, and joint venture) are the strategic 
behavior perspective (Kogut, 1988; Porter & Fuller, 1986), the theory of in- 
ternational production (Dunning, 1995), and transaction cost economics 
(Gulati, 1995; Hennart, 1988). 
Alliances entail problems of coordination and mutual dependence. 
Transaction cost economics in particular has focused on these problems. 
Chiles and McMakin (1996) distinguished two perspectives in transaction 
cost economics. The first is a long-term evolutionary perspective in which 
objective transaction costs determine the survival of the fittest governance 
forms. The second is a short-term managerial choice perspective in which 
managers act on subjective costs that are based on varying perceptions and 
evaluations of risk. The latter explains why firms in similar circumstances 
may make different make-or-buy trade-offs. We took the latter perspective. 
According to transaction cost economics, dependencies are the result of 
switching costs, which arise from specific investments, investments worth 
less or nothing outside a given alliance (Williamson, 1975). Although the 
objective of a partnership is joint creation of value, there is a fiduciary risk 
of opportunistic exploitation of dependence. This risk may lead partners to 
integrate activities in a single firm, which offers better control of opportun- 
ism (Joskow, 1985; Williamson, 1975), through sales of assets, a merger or an 
acquisition, or an equity joint venture.' But a nonintegrative contractual 
alliance between different firms has advantages over integration: the strong 
incentives experienced by separate firms responsible for their own survival, 
the economies of scale realized in production by specialized firms (William- 
son, 1975), and great flexibility in the configuration of scope, which indi- 
cates efficiencies from cost sharing between products. 
But such alliances raise complicated issues of governance as they are 
"hybrid" forms of organization between market and hierarchy (Williamson, 
1991). The fiduciary risks of dependence, corresponding problems of coor- 
dination, and problems of spillover need to be dealt with. Daems (1983) 
discussed different forms of governance in different industries; Lei and 
Slocum (1991) compared licensing, joint ventures, and consortia; Osborn 
and Baughn (1990) contrasted joint ventures and contractual modes for 
international alliances; Walker and Poppo (1991) compared coordination 
mechanisms between and within organizations; Walker and Weber (1987) 
' In the following, we use joint venture to refer to an equity joint venture, which is a new 
firm set up with equity supplied by parent firms. 
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discussed adjustment, switching, and transaction costs; and Teece (1986) 
studied problems of spillover, the role of complementary assets in innova- 
tion, and implications for integration, licensing, and collaboration. Grandori 
(1995) attempted to systematically inventory governance forms under dif- 
ferent conditions. 
Traditionally, approaches from economics have focused on the roles of 
self-interest and opportunism. The threat of opportunism has to be taken 
into account, and means of constraining opportunism include contracts and 
monitoring, which Williamson (1975) called "legal ordering"; incentives 
such as shared ownership of specific investments; restraint of opportunism 
to safeguard future profits yielded by cooperation (Axelrod, 1984; Heide & 
Miner, 1992); and a reputation mechanism, or posting of hostages, which 
Williamson (1985) called "private ordering." In early work, Williamson 
(1975) recognized the relevance of "atmosphere," but he did not further 
develop this notion in his later work (Williamson, 1985). Williamson (1993) 
posited that trust makes sense only if it goes beyond calculative self-interest, 
but since he maintained the centrality of calculativeness, there is no room in 
his view for trust. In other research traditions, notably the work of the In- 
dustrial Marketing and Purchasing Group (IMP), trust is a central variable 
(Easton, 1989; HBkansson, 1982, 1987, 1989; Johanson & Mattsson, 1987). 
But in that perspective, trust is viewed as so pervasive that the role of 
self-interest and the temptations of opportunism are ignored. In various 
other studies, trust has been viewed as the glue that keeps business partners 
together (Barber, 1983; Killing, 1988; Lorenz, 1988; Palay, 1984). Our per- 
spective is that trust and opportunism both play roles, and that trust, coer- 
cion, and incentives are all relevant dimensions of goverance (cf. Buckley & 
Casson, 1988). 
In addition to limiting transaction costs, trust may also form part of the 
utility of a relationship. According to social exchange theory (Blau, 1964), 
exchange and cooperation often have a social dimension (intrinsic utility) as 
well as an economic dimension (extrinsic utility). Economists tend to think 
of value in exchange as something that exists independent of a transaction. 
As Murakami and Rohlen noted, "The value of the relationship itself is 
typically ignored and the impersonality of the transaction is assumed" 
(1992: 70). In intrinsic utility, the exchange process itself matters, as does the 
economic surplus that the exchange yields. Buckley and Casson (1988) also 
recognized the significance of the exchange process. People may prefer to 
transact on the basis of trust and its sources: ethics, kinship, friendship, and 
empathy. Social exchange relies more on unspecified, implicit obligations, 
which depend on shared systems of meaning, belief, and ethics, than on 
formal contracts. The idea that exchange includes noncontractural elements 
goes back (at least) to Durkheim. 
The economic relevance of trust is that it reduces the specification and 
monitoring of contracts, provides material incentives for cooperation, and 
reduces uncertainty (Hill, 1990). Transactions are thus cheaper, more agree- 
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able, and more flexible. With detailed formal contracts, it is more difficult 
(slow and costly) to modify terms when conditions change. Apart from its 
own worth, trust pays. But it also carries the risk of betrayal. 
The purpose of the present study was to extend the transaction cost 
framework to address trust and to test that extended framework empirically. 
More specifically, we sought to determine (1)whether the instruments for 
governance posited in transaction cost economics as related to coercion 
(contracts, monitoring, hostages) and to incentives (long-term perspective, 
reputation, reciprocal dependence) have an effect on perceived relational 
risk, and (2) whether trust also has a significant effect on relational risk. 
Finding such an effect would falsify the claim of previous theory that trust 
is a redundant concept. 
For an empirical test, this study focused on a particular type of alliance: 
the buyer-seller dyad. The extensive literature that has developed is chiefly 
based on the marketing channels paradigm, resource dependence theory, 
transaction cost economics reasoning, and relational contract theory (Heide, 
1994). Some researchers have paid attention to the degree of partners' close- 
ness, a concept with multiple facets, including cooperation, collaboration, 
commitment, joint action, and expectations of continuity (Anderson, 1996). 
Our work belongs to this stream in the literature, but it more explicitly 
combines insights from transaction cost economics with other factors. We 
saw trust between parties as shaping the evaluation of the risk of dependence 
stemming from, among other things, investments in relation-specific assets. 
TRUST 
To proceed, we first need to define trust and to specify a framework in 
which it fits with other aspects of governance. Trust may concern a partner's 
ability to perform according to the intentions and expectations of a relation- 
ship (competence trust) or his or her intentions not to defect (intentional 
trust; cf. Barber, 1983). Here, we focus on the latter type of trust. Of course, 
risks arising from failures of competence are important in subcontracting 
relations, but our focus was on the relation between intentional trust and 
cooperation. However, we did not ignore competence trust; the reliability of 
a partner's competence is included in the measure of the partner's value." 
It is useful to distinguish between behavioral trust, "the willingness to 
increase one's vulnerability to another whose behavior is not under one's 
control" (Zand, 1972: 230), from intentional trust, or the subjective prob- 
ability that one assigns to benevolent action by another agent or group of 
agents (cf. Dasgupta, 1988; Gambetta, 1988; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 
1995). Behavioral trust can be based on intentional trust, but can also be 
based on other factors (such as a failure to recognize unilateral dependence), 
and the existence of intentional trust cannot be inferred from the presence of 
"or example, to evaluate a supplier we looked not only at quality, but also at quality 
assurance, and not only at delivery time, but also at delivery reliability. 
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behavioral trust alone (Craswell, 1993; Kee & Knox, 1970; Noorderhaven, 
1995, 1996). Consequently, in order to use intentional trust as an explanatory 
variable, we had to measure it independently. 
Since our focus was on relations between organizations, the question of 
the relation between the conduct of individuals and the conduct of firms 
arises. As Ring and Van de Ven (1994) argued, they are related by the roles 
individuals are assigned in organizations. Conduct "qua persona" is re- 
stricted and guided by organizational roles. Alignment between the two 
types of conduct can be a problem. If cooperation is founded on trust based 
on personal bonding, problems may arise concerning the exigencies of 
organizational role. Personal loyalty may deviate from organizational inter- 
est and may even lead to corruption or embezzlement. The development of 
personal ties that are too strong may need to be prevented by personnel 
turnover. Conversely, personnel change may lead to a breakdown of rela- 
tions based on personal trust. Such considerations should be part of gover- 
nance. 
Our approach to the problem noted above was as follows. First of all, if 
trust is indeed a subjective probability assigned to conduct, it can logically 
apply to a subjective probability held by an individual with respect to the 
conduct of an organization. Of course, this subjective probability may, at 
least in part, be based on the experiences and perceptions of and constraints 
on members of the organization with which the focal individual's organiza- 
tion is related. Thus, we treated trust in terms of the relational risk with 
respect to a partner organization perceived by an individual who enacts the 
relation with the partner organization. This formulation yields the first in a 
series of propositions that structure our theoretical analysis: It makes sense 
to treat trust as a perception of an individual with respect to a partner 
organization. The argument implies that trust is not an objective condition 
and that it varies between individuals, even those in otherwise identical 
conditions. 
DIMENSIONS OF TRUST 
Williams (1988) proposed a scheme for the determinants of cooperation, 
which is reproduced as Figure 1. Williams argued that none of these sources 
by itself suffices, that, in cooperation, some mix will always be operative, 
and that no universally best mix can be specified. Often, trust will not suffice 
as a basis for cooperation. Conversely, material self-interest and coercion are 
seldom sufficient as a basis for cooperation: since one partner cannot fully 
control the other's conduct by threat and reward (cf. Deutsch, 1973), each 
needs trust to strengthen this fragile basis for cooperation (Ring & Van de 
Ven, 1994). 
If trust is identified with a subjective probability that a partner will not 
abuse one's dependence, without further qualification, then anything that 
contributes to such subjective probability would belong to trust-anything 
that restrains the partner from opportunistic conduct. That would include 
the direct control that one partner may exercise over the other's conduct by 
-- 
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FIGURE 1 

Sources of Cooperation 

- -- 
Macro Level Micro Level 
Egotistic Coercion or fear of Material advantage 
sanctions from some or interest 
authority (God, law) 
Nonegotistic Ethics: Valueslnorms Bonds of friendship, 
of proper conduct kinship, or empathy 
Source: Williams (1988). 
contract, monitoring, or threat (coercion). It would also include motives of 
self-interest that restrain the partner, such as the preservation of its reputa- 
tion (Weigelt & Camerer, 1988), expectation of future rewards from coopera- 
tive conduct in the present (Telser, 1980), or the desire to protect hostages 
(Williamson, 1985). Indeed, these sources are often included in the notion of 
trust (e.g, Chiles & McMakin, 1996), and Williamson (1993) discounted as 
unnecessary any notions of trust not based on the promotion or protection of 
self-interest. However, we adopted a narrower notion of trust, as going be- 
yond self-interest: an individual trusts someone if he or she believes the 
other is likely to cooperate even if the latter is not coerced to do so and has 
no direct material interest in doing so. There are two arguments for this view. 
One is that it corresponds more closely to intuitions: Is a perception really 
trust when one expects someone to conform to agreements out of self-interest 
or coercion? We agree with Williamson that trust makes sense only if it goes 
beyond calculative self-interest. Following Nooteboom (1996), we propose 
that an individual trusts someone when he or she is willing to forego guar- 
antees based on coercion or self-interest. Only then does trust economize on 
transaction costs. This notion was the second reason we saw trust as we did: 
we wanted to investigate how causes beyond coercion and self-interest could 
affect relational risk. Thus, our second proposition is that trust is a source of 
cooperation that coexists with sources of cooperation based on self-interest 
and coercion. In Figure 1,trust is associated with the nonegotistic sources of 
cooperation; loyalty to a partner results from norms and ethics and from 
bonds of friendship or kinship rather than from coercion and material self- 
interest. Thus, proposition three is that one dimension of trust is the insti- 
tutionalization of values and norms that constitute an ethics of transactional 
relationships. It would not be justified to say that the recognition of such 
institutions is absent from traditional transaction cost economics. William- 
son (1991), for example, recognized the effect of the "institutional environ- 
ment" on transaction costs, but under the assumption that such an environ- 
ment applied equally to all actors in a given context or national culture. This 
assumption does not serve to distinguish between alternatives of governance 
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structure ("institutional arrangements") within a given context. We disagree 
for two reasons. First, susceptibility to values and norms (which we take to 
be part of the institutional environment) is likely to differ between individu- 
als and between organizations, as a function of organizational culture. Thus, 
the impact of values and norms may vary within national boundaries (cf. 
Noorderhaven, 1995). Second, institutions may not be exogenous to a trans- 
action relationship and may partly develop within it (Ford, 1980). 
The second dimension of trust pertains to attachments between trans- 
acting firms in the form of friendship or kinship bonds (Seabright, Levinthal, 
& Fichman, 1992), which we indicate as "habitualization."" This form of 
trust is related to the concept of social exchange indicated before. Social 
exchange is, by its nature, restricted to insiders: people with whom a focal 
individual shares bonds. Trust requires familiarity and mutal understanding 
and, hence, depends on time and context, on habit formation, and on the 
positive development of a relation. Repeated interactions lead to the forming 
of habits and the institutionalization of behavior (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). 
Consequently, patterns of behavior are shielded from rational decision mak- 
ing in the pursuit of efficiency. Case study research has borne out that in 
industrial buying relations, buyers display a strong tendency to persist in the 
use of existing suppliers (Woodside & Moller, 1992). This kind of inertia has 
to be reckoned with in a theory of vertical interfirm relations. 
As Hirschman (1984) indicated, trust, unlike most economic commodi- 
ties, can grow rather than wear out through use. Thus, habitualization be- 
comes part of the "invisible assets" (Itami & Roehl, 1987) that make future 
cooperation easier to implement. If trust is associated with a subjective prob- 
ability that a partner will cooperate, then optimism, positive experience, and 
naivety decrease that subjective probability, and trust therefore varies among 
agents, even under similar circumstances. A zero probability, or blind dis- 
trust, prevents an agent from cooperation and thus prevents the opportunity 
to build trust based on successful cooperation, so zero trust remains zero (cf. 
Gambetta, 1988). But if, on the basis of a nonzero subjective probability of 
cooperation by a partner, an individual enters cooperation, experience will 
lead to adjustment of the probability. If subjective probability is adapted to 
experience in a Bayesian process, it increases with positive experience. 
However, negative experience is likely to have a greater impact: when trust 
is betrayed, it may take a long time to build up again. If trust is blind, in the 
form of a unit subjective probability, it is likely to cause disappointment 
sooner or later because few partners will be able to resist every opportunity 
for defection. But positive experiences with a relationship plus an expansion 
of its scope will enhance a favorable perception of the probability of coop- 
eration. Thus, the fourth and final proposition guiding our research was that 
Presumably, trust based on such bonds would be close to Williamson's (1993) notion of 
personal trust, which he reserved for nontransactional relations with friends, family, and other 
loved ones. We do not accept such radical separation between impersonal business relations 
and personal relations. 
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a second dimension of trust is habitualization, defined as familiarization, 
habit formation, and bonding generated or confirmed by positive experi- 
ences. 
Our two dimensions of trust, institutionalization and habitualization, 
correspond to two of the three "factors of perceived trustworthiness" pro- 
posed by Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) on the basis of an overview of 
the trust literature. Benevolence, in Mayer and colleagues' analysis, is "the 
extent to which a trustee is believed to want to do good to the trustor, aside 
from an egocentric profit motive" (1995: 718). This corresponds roughly to 
our dimension of habitualization. Integrity is "the trustor's perception that 
the trustee adheres to a set of principles that the trustor finds acceptable" 
(Mayer et al., 1995: 719). This aspect, based on, among other things, Sitkin 
and Roth's (1993: 368) concept of value congruence, clearly parallels our 
dimension of institutionalization. The third aspect distinguished by Mayer 
and colleagues is ability, akin to the concept of competence trust discussed 
above. 
We noted that the two dimensions of trust are closely related in the 
notion of embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985): social relations often jointly 
develop norms or institutions and bonds of friendship or empathy. Thus, it 
may not be possible to separate the two dimensions in empirical work. 
TRUST AND GOVERNANCE 
We proposed that trust, in the narrow sense defined here, is a significant 
source of cooperation, along with coercion and self-interest. It yields a sig- 
nificant addition to governance as conceived by Williamson (1985, 1993), 
who looked only at contractual coercion (legal ordering) and self-interested 
incentives (private ordering). To embed non-self-interested trust in a wider 
scheme of governance, we proceeded as follows (cf. Nooteboom, 1996): X is 
willing to engage in cooperation with Y (either begin or continue coopera- 
tion), even if this makes X dependent, if X has a more or less well-grounded 
belief in the form of a subjective probability that Y will cooperate in the 
sense of not misusing such dependence. This belief may be based on the 
perceived available opportunities for misuse on the part of Y, Y's incentives 
for misuse, and Y's propensity to employ the opportunities. Propensity to 
use opportunities for defection in particular is related to trust, which has its 
basis in ethics, kinship, friendship, or empathy. 
Our definition of intentional trust is now as follows: X trusts Y to the 
extent that X chooses to cooperate with Y on the basis of a subjective prob- 
ability that Y will choose not to employ opportunities for defection that X 
considers damaging, even if it is in the interest of Y to do so. According to 
this definition, trust goes beyond forbearance, which Buckley and Casson 
(1988), defined as honoring both formal and informal obligations. Trust goes 
beyond obligations based on agreements and also applies to unforeseen con- 
tingencies. 
The analysis is elaborated into the following scheme for the risk of 
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opportunism for the focal agent, labeled "ego," in relation with his or her 
partner, labeled "alter," (Nooteboom, 1996). We employ these terms in the 
remainder of this report because the scheme applies equally to both sides 
and is claimed to apply not only to the buyer-seller relations we studied, but 
also to interfirm relations and alliances in general. With the terms ego and 
alter, we also stress that we are not dealing with objective, impersonal forces 
and that each partner has his or her own perspective and more or less 
subjective perceptions, in line with the managerial choice perspective 
(Chiles & McMakin, 1996) that we adopted from the start. 
Figure 2 depicts the perceptions of ego: how the size and probability of 
the loss he or she perceives depends on the partner's (alter's) perceived 
opportunities, propensity, and incentives for opportunism. A similar 
scheme applies to that partner. 
The risk of opportunism has two dimensions: the probability that alter 
will behave opportunistically, and the loss ego incurs if he or she does. In an 
earlier study (Berger, Noorderhaven, & Nooteboom, 1995), we investigated 
the determinants of only one side of risk: the size of a possible loss. Here we 
wanted to investigate the explanation of both sides of risk simultaneously. 
Relational risk has several causes. In the top half of the scheme we find 
the determinants of incentives for opportunism. Alter is tempted toward 
opportunism to the extent that ego is captive because of the value of alter 
relative to alternatives and ego's switching costs. It should be noted that in 
FIGURE 2 

Determinants of Risk of Opportunism: 

Perceptions of Ego 







Opportunism of Alter 
Restriction of 
of Loss for Ego 
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addition to switching costs (which may be due to dedicated investments), we 
recognize the value of the partner, which constitutes the reason for embark- 
ing upon the relationship. In this view, transaction costs can arise if there are 
no dedicated assets or other sources of switching costs (Walker & Weber, 
1987).~We note also that alliances are entertained not only to minimize total 
production and transaction costs, as transaction cost economics suggests, 
but also for reasons of strategy-access to resources, market entry, preemp- 
tion of competition-and exchanges of competencies (Contractor & Lorange, 
1988; Kogut, 1988). Value is specified in relative terms, as excess over the 
next best alternative partner. Value is higher to the extent that the partner 
has a unique, valuable offering, and it is at its highest when the partner has 
a monopoly. Thus, value also depends on market structure (Kogut, 1988). 
Together, the value of the partner and switching costs determine captive- 
ness, or dependence, which provides the partner with an incentive to defect 
by taking advantage of it. But this advantage works only to the extent that 
dependence is asymmetric. Alter's incentive toward opportunism is reduced 
to the extent that he or she is dependent upon ego, given his or her par- 
ticipation in ownership of specific assets, or because of the future rewards of 
cooperation. 
However, such a threat of defection does not always exist. If a partner 
only obtains benefit from actual contribution, there is no problem. For ex- 
ample, if in joint research alter can benefit from ego's knowledge only if alter 
has developed the capacity to absorb the knowledge by contributing to the 
research (Grandori, 1995), then opportunism is self-defeating. 
Figure 2 indicates that there are several ways to restrain opportunism, if 
a partner has incentives toward it. One way is direct supervision and au- 
thority, bringing the relationship under unified control through a merger1 
acquisition or a joint venture (hierarchy, in transaction cost economics). The 
second is control by means of contract, the legal and private ordering of 
transaction cost economics. In Figure 2 we add trust, as discussed, in the 
(perceived) propensity of an agent to exploit room for opportunism. 
Figure 2 suggests many instruments for controlling relational risk: (1) 
Ego can reduce its stake in specific assets, and thereby reduce switching 
costs, yielding less captiveness and a smaller potential loss (in case the 
relationship breaks or the partner takes opportunistic action). (2) Ego can 
diversify so that the value of one partner relative to the next best one is 
reduced, thus reducing captiveness and potential loss. (3) Ego can limit room 
for alter's opportunism through contracts and monitoring. (4)Ego can reduce 
the partner's opportunities (or incentives) for opportunism by taking hos- 
tages. (5) Ego can reduce the partner's opportunities for opportunism by 
takeover or by instituting a joint venture (the latter might also be interpreted 
However, the value of a partner as can be viewed a switching cost, as value ego stands to 
lose when the relationship is discontinued. 
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as taking a hostage). (6) Ego can reduce the partner's incentives for oppor- 
tunism by building an attractive fiiture potential for cooperation. (7) Ego can 
reduce alter's incentives for opportunism by threatening to damage alter's 
reputation. (8) Ego can reduce alter's incentives for opportunism by increas- 
ing alter's stake in specific assets, thereby increasing his or her switching 
costs and potential loss. (9) Ego can reduce alter's incentives for opportun- 
ism by increasing the uniqueness of ego's value for alter. (10) Ego can reduce 
alter's propensity toward opportunism by building trust through personal 
bonds and shared norms and values. (11)Ego can select only partners with 
whom ego shares many norms and values. 
Each of these instruments has its cost or problems. Generally, in trans- 
action cost economics expectations concerning self-interest are expected to 
be less binding than authority (Dow, 1987; Walker & Poppo, 1991). But 
unified control in a mergerlacquisition carries the price of fewer high- 
powered incentives and flexibility and the risks that different cultures will 
not be effectively integrated. A joint venture carries set-up costs and also 
risks of integration failure. Strict contractual control may set off a vicious 
cycle of suspicion and retaliation via restrictions, which may stifle a rela- 
tionship. It also reduces flexibility, which may work against joint develop- 
ment since at the outset of a relationship firms cannot define expectations or 
demands exactly. Monitoring may be technically infeasible, and it matters 
whether a partner can observe performance (output) or only effort (input; 
Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Reduced commitment in 
specific assets may destroy the objective of developing complementary com- 
petencies for joint development. In some technologies, however, specialized 
products can be made with general purpose assets, so that the need for 
specific assets is limited (Nooteboom, 1993a). Diversification of partners, to 
limit the uniqueness of any of them, multiplies costs and may provide a 
disincentive for all partners to do their best. The availability of partners 
depends on market structure. The basis for trust may be absent in novel 
alliances between partners without any common cultural background. Thus, 
the optimal governance package depends on a number of contingencies: the 
objectives of an alliance, the structure of payoffs, market structure, and tech- 
nical and cultural conditions. 
Trust can only be considered an instrument of governance in a limited 
sense: it contributes to risk reduction, but it cannot be instituted instanta- 
neously. If trust is not already present, it has to be built by developing bonds 
or shared norms and values. It can be more an outcome than a precondition 
of a relation, in which case it provides an improved basis for ongoing coop- 
eration. Shared norms and values should, however, be a criterion for the 
selection of partners and in that sense can serve as an instrument. 
The contingency of many possible configurations of governance under 
different conditions has implications for the conclusions of any empirical 
study, including our own. Finding no hypothesized effect of some purported 
instrument of governance does not prove that the instrument is irrelevant in 
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general. Lack of significance may just mean that it does not fit the contin- 
gencies of the case at hand. On the other hand, finding an effect proves that 
an instrument is relevant, even if in other cases relevance is not apparent. 
HYPOTHESES 
For our present purpose, we used the scheme in Figure 2 to derive 
hypotheses for empirical testing. We note that our focus was differences in 
the size and the probability of the potential loss perceived by transaction 
partners. This focus is not customary in transaction cost economics or in 
previous studies of alliances. Some of the factors that we expected to be 
important have been included in previous empirical work, but our hypoth- 
eses concerning the size and probability of risk are novel and cannot be 
directly derived from previous empirical work. The hypotheses are logically 
derived from the analytical framework described above. 
The first two hypotheses concern what the focal partner (X) stands to 
lose if the relationship with Y breaks. In line with the logic of transaction 
cost economics, this potential loss constitutes the maximum for which X can 
be "held up" and thereby defines the maximum size of the loss that X can 
incur. This loss thus affects the size rather than the probability of loss: it is 
not the size of perceived potential loss that may induce the partner to engage 
in opportunistic conduct, but the measures of governance that we will con- 
sider later. Logically, then, this maximum size of loss for X is equal to the 
total value of Y relative to that of the next-best option, plus the switching 
costs that X would incur in switching to the next-best alternative. The core 
of transaction cost economics is that switching costs for X are constituted by 
assets that are owned or guaranteed by X and are specific to the relation- 
ship-that is, they would need to be incurred again in a similar relation with 
another partnere5 Thus, 
Hypothesis 1 .  The value that a partner offers relative to 
the next-best alternative has a positive effect on the size of 
possible loss rather than an effect on its perceived prob- 
ability. 
Hypothesis 2. The costs of switching to an alternative 
partner, measured by means of asset specificity, have a 
positive effect on the size of possible loss rather than an 
effect on its perceived probability. 
Now we turn to instruments of governance and contingencies, which 
affect the opportunities for alter to defect-to break a relation or threaten to 
do so, and thereby affect the probability-rather than the size-of loss. First 
of all, traditionally, the threat of sanctions, in legal or private ordering, plus 
the monitoring required to impose them, has been seen as the main instru- 
We note that switching costs may be more than assets owned or vouched for: they may 
include loss of hostages or reputation. 
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ment for imposing compliance with the terms of an agreement. In legal 
ordering this imposition occurs by means of contracts that can be enforced 
in a court of law, such as the detailed contracts negotiated in the relationship 
between electric utilities and coal mines (Joskow, 1985). In private ordering 
it can take the form of posting hostages, reputation mechanisms, and other 
restraints. We reconstruct these forms of ordering in terms of restricting 
opportunism. 
Hypothesis 3a. Legal ordering, taken as a restriction of 
room for a partner's opportunism, has a negative effect on 
the perceived probability of loss rather than an effect on 
its size. 
Hypothesis 3b. Private ordering, taken as a restriction of 
room for a partner's opportunism, has a negative effect on 
the perceived probability of loss rather than an effect on 
its size. 
Next, we turn to trust, which constitutes the core of the present article, with 
its two dimensions of institutionalization and habitualization. We propose 
that trust yields an additional basis for restraining opportunism and that it 
operates by limiting the inclination of alter to employ available room for 
opportunism (Figure 2). Thereby it reduces the probability of loss (rather 
than its size) and enables partners to go foward, even though not all contin- 
gencies arising in the relationship are known (Andaleeb, 1992). In a previous 
study, we found a negative effect of trust on perceived dependence (Berger 
et al., 1995), but here, with a different data set, we wanted to be more precise, 
and we hypothesized trust to negatively affect the perceived probability of 
loss, not the size of loss. 
Hypothesis 4a. Institutionalization (partners' shared 
norms and values) has a negative effect on the perceived 
probability of loss rather than an effect on its size. 
Hypothesis 4b. Habitualization (partners' having estab- 
lished habits, bonds, good communication, and empathy) 
has a negative effect on the perceived probability of loss 
rather than an effect on its size. 
Next, we allow for an effect of self-confidence: an agent who is confident of 
her or his own value will be more trusting than one who is diffident (cf. 
Deutsch, 1973): the agent will perceive a smaller probability of loss. An 
effect of own value can also be interpreted differently. According to Figure 
2, alter has less incentive toward opportunism to the extent that he or she 
depends on ego, since ego might retaliate with opportunism. If ego is con- 
fident about her or his value to alter, ego may rationally expect alter to have 
little incentive toward opportunism, and ego will therefore perceive a lower 
probability of loss. 
Hypothesis 5. The value one partner offers another (rela- 
tive to the partner's next best alternative) has a negative 
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effect on the perceived probability of loss rather than an 
effect on its size. 
The literature on repeated games (Axelrod, 1984) demonstrates how the 
expectation of future cooperation reduces the incentive for opportunistic 
behavior: short-term benefits from defection may be less than long-term 
gains from ongoing cooperation. Long-term business relations have been 
shown to lead to closer cooperation and more collaboration (Lane & Bach-
mann, 1996). Heide and Miner (1992) found a positive relationship between 
expected continuity and cooperation but did not look at perceived depen- 
dence and the associated risk. We propose that in long-term relationships 
there is more at stake, yielding a positive effect on size of loss. But long-term 
relations also offer more possibilities of establishing personal ties and of 
growing trust as an invisible asset, so the perceived probability of loss is 
lower. 
Hypothesis 6a. The past growth of a relationship has a 
positive effect on the size of loss and a negative effect on 
the perceived probability of loss. 
Hypothesis 66. A long-term perspective has a positive ef- 
fect on the size of loss and a negative effect on the per- 
ceived probability of loss. 
Hypotheses 5, 6a, and 6b do not pertain to trust, as narrowly defined before, 
in that the variables posited to affect loss are egotistic sources of cooperation: 
they pertain to the rational evaluation of self-interest. They do not affect 
inclination toward opportunism, but do affect incentives inspired by self- 
interest. According to Emerson's (1962) theory of dependence as well, ego's 
dependence on alter can be balanced by alter's dependence on ego. To the 
extent that ego knows alter to be dependent on him- or herself, ego will 
perceive loss associated with his own dependence on alter to be less prob- 
able. This is one interpretation of the effect of ego's own value for alter, 
(Hypothesis 5 ) ,  and we can proceed further along this line: ego may have 
other knowledge of alter's dependence that may constrain alter's perceived 
incentives for opportunism, as illustrated in Figure 2. Thus, 
Hypothesis 7. Other factors that promote a partner's de- 
pendence, and thereby reduce his or her incentives for 
opportunistic behavior, have a negative effect on the per- 
ceived probability of loss rather than an effect on its size. 
CONTROLS 
From the perspective of managerial choice (Chiles & McMakin, 1996), 
and in view of the structure of our data (ten customer relationships for each 
of ten suppliers), we expected firm-specific effects. To what extent are per- 
ceptions of relational risk determined by characteristics of the perceiver 
rather than by the objective conditions of a transaction relationship? Our em- 
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pirical work was designed as an experiment to investigate such effects, along 
with systematic effects of the configuration of governance. 
First of all, some people (and some firms) are more sensitive to risks 
(exhibit higher uncertainty avoidance) than others. Uncertainty avoidance, 
originally conceptualized as a dimension of national culture by Hofstede 
(1980), was later shown to also be associated with organization-level vari- 
ables (Hofstede, Nuijen, Ohayv, & Sanders, 1990). We expected that, ceteris 
paribus, firms with higher uncertainty avoidance would perceive higher 
risks; in particular, higher probability of loss. Thus, 
Hypothesis 8. High uncertainty avoidance on the part of a 
focal agent has a positive effect on the perceived probabil- 
ity of loss rather than an effect on the size of loss. 
A large firm is likely to be subject to lower transaction costs and relational 
risk than a small firm, as a result of its high capacities for search, contract 
design, monitoring, and litigation, strong specialized staff functions, and 
wide range of products, markets, and transaction relations, which yield op- 
portunities for alternative employment of partially specific assets, lower 
switching costs, and a greater spread of risk (Nooteboom, 199313). Conse- 
quently, a large firm is likely to incur lower risk. 
Hypothesis 9. The size of the firm of a focal agent has a 
negative effect on the size of loss rather than an effect on 
its perceived probability. 
However, as we could not be sure that firm characteristics such as uncer- 
tainty avoidance and size would account for all firm-specific effects, we 
added dummy variables for firms to test for remaining effects. 
DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
A major question was how trust was to be measured. We used factor 
analysis to construct measures from multiple questionnaire items relating to 
the different dimensions of trust contained in a survey of buyer-seller rela- 
tions. 
One assumption guiding our analysis was that opportunism and trust 
are to some extent idiosyncratic: they vary between people and organiza- 
tions even if other conditions are identical. As a result, trust, governance 
choices, and their effects on perceived risk will vary between people. We 
wanted to include this assumption in our study and therefore asked each of 
ten suppliers in the same industry about ten customer relationships. We 
could thus test for systematic effects of trust, governance, and so forth, as 
opposed to firm-specific effects. 
The study focused on the microelectronics assembly industry in the 
Netherlands, which produces components for such things as telecommuni- 
cations equipment and process control devices, often in small series and 
according to the specifications of buying firms. Suppliers were approached 
through the employer's association for the electronics and metal industry in 
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the Netherlands. Ten suppliers agreed to cooperate. In the beginning of 1994, 
a member of the research team visited these firms. These visits took an 
average of three-and-one-half hours. During the visit, the researcher col- 
lected data pertaining to relationships with ten of the firm's most important 
customers. The questionnaire was based on one we had developed and 
tested in a previous study (Berger et al., 1995) of 80 suppliers of a single 
manufacturer of photocopying machines. For the current study, we omitted 
items that had proved to be of little value and added some new items. Either 
the general manager or the sale manager of a firm completed the question- 
naire, with the researcher clarifying questions when necessary. This proce- 
dure minimized the risk of respondents' misunderstanding the questions 
and also guaranteed that there were no nonresponses, and hence, no missing 
data. To maintain comparability between relationships, we designed the 
questionnaires to be completed horizontally: a respondent answered a ques- 
tion for all 10 relationships before moving on to the next question. In this 
way, data were obtained with regard to 97 relationships. 
Apart from variables that by their nature are binary (yeslno) or cardinal 
(e.g., firm sales) all items on the questionnaire had five-point response 
scales. We chose the items on the basis of their hypothesized relation to 
latent variables that resulted from the theoretical analysis. Most variables 
were represented by multiple underlying items, but some had only a single 
item. We used confirmatory factor analysis to test the measurement hypoth- 
eses and Cronbach's alpha to determine overall construct reliability, setting 
the cut-off point at the usual value of .70. Factor loadings were used to 
determine whether each item contributed significantly to the joint factor, 
with the cut-off point at the usual value of 0.3. When an item had a lower 
loading, it was dropped, and the analysis was repeated for the remaining 
items until a reliable scale with reliable loadings emerged. We then added 
the items to yield a measure of the latent variable. The Appendix gives the 
resulting scales with their alpha values and specification of the underlying 
items. As shown, all multi-item scales had alphas above .70, except growth 
of business between the partners (a= .68). 
The size of ego's potential loss was measured on a two-item scale, and 
the probability of loss on only a one-item scale. For the relative value that a 
partner offered, we had two measures: the partner's share of the total sales of 
ego, and a scale of four other items, the remaining indicators of the value of 
alter. As joining these measures into one scale of partner value greatly re- 
duced the alpha coefficient, we used both measures. Ego's asset specificity 
was the aggregate of four variables, one for each dimension of asset speci- 
ficity specified by Williamson, with a total of ten items. Restriction of room 
for alter's opportunism was the aggregate of two scales, one for legal ordering 
and one for private ordering, with a total of seven items. Trust was the 
aggregate of two dimensions, habitualization and institutionalization, with a 
total of six items. The relative value offered by ego to alter was an aggregate 
of six items. Continuity of the relationship was an aggregate of two scales, 
past growth of the relationship and future perspective, with a total of five 
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items. Limitation of alter's inclination toward opportunism, or restraint of 
alter, was composed of five items, and uncertainty avoidance of ego had 
seven items. Firm size of ego was naturally a cardinal measure. 
First, we tested the idea that the size of ego's potential loss and the 
probability of such loss constituted separate dimensions. In factor-analytic 
terms, we asked if the dimensions were orthogonal. To determine this, we 
compared the results of a factor analysis of the two items underlying size of 
loss with results on the three items of size of loss and probability of loss 
taken together. Table 1reports the results. 
The table shows that Cronbach's alpha, which was quite high for the size 
of loss, deteriorated drastically when the single item for probability of loss 
was added (from a = .90 to a = .26). A factor is then formed, with high 
loadings from the items of size of loss (.95, .86), but a low loading (.34) from 
the probability item, with a correspondingly low communality (.12) of that 
item with the factor. The loading is only just above the cut-off point of .3. 
This is sufficient evidence to conclude that our measurements of size and 
probability of loss indeed represent separate dimensions, warranting sepa- 
rate regression equations to explain each. 
To test the hypotheses explaining size of loss and probability of loss, we 
regressed these variables on the explanatory variables pertaining to the main 
categories of causation: the captiveness of ego (alter's relative value, based 
on its share of sales and the rest of its value, and on switching costs resulting 
from ego's dedicated and specific assets); governance (restriction of room for 
alter's opportunism through legal ordering and private ordering); alter's in- 
centives (the value ego offers alter, the continuity of the relationship, and the 
restraint of alter); trust (habitualization and institutionalization); and the 
control variables (ego's uncertainty avoidance and ego's size). 
In a second set of analyses, we split up the explanatory variables into 
their components. We used a backward procedure, including all the ex- 
planatory variables initially and then eliminating variables with nonsignif- 
icant effects (effects at a lower than 90 percent confidence level. Table 2 
gives results, indicating which hypotheses were confirmed and which were 
not. Most of the hypotheses were confirmed. We present a systematic dis- 
cussion later in the article, showing that in some cases lack of confirmation 
yields interesting interpretations. 
TABLE 1 
Orthogonality of Size of Loss and Probability of Lossa 
Factor 
Construct a Items Loading Communality 
Size of loss 















Probabilitv -0.34 0.12 
- - - - - - -- - - - - 
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TABLE 2 

Results of Regression Analysisa 

Hypothesis Size Hypothesis Probability 
Hypothesis and Variable Confirmed? of Loss Confirmed? of Loss 
H I :  Value of alter 
Alter's share of sales Yes 0.59 Yes 0.02 
(O.O)** (0.79) 
Remaining indicators of alter's value No 0.07 Yes -0.05 
(0.45) (0.60) 
HZ: Asset specificity No 0.10 Yes 0.11 
(0.31) (0.21) 
H3: Restriction of room 
for alter's opportunism Yes 0.10 Yes -0.34 
(0.20) (O.O)** 
H4a, H4b: Trust Yes -0.06 Yes -0.22 
(0.43) (0.03)* 
H5: Value of ego for alter Yes -0.03 No -0.05 
(0.72) (0.58) 
H6: Continuity Yes 0.28 Yes -0.25 
(O.O)** (0.02)* 
H7: Restraint of alter 
H8: Uncertainty avoidance Yes 0.07 No -0.20 
(0.33) (0.02)* 




" N = 97. Standardized coefficients are shown, with significance levels in parentheses. In 
the final step of the backward procedure, only those variables are retained that have a significant 
effect ( p  < .05);the values and significance levels of other variables derive from earlier steps. 
* p < .05 

* *  p < .01 

The most striking lack of confirmation concerns the effect of the re- 
straint of alter, a measure of limits on incentives for opportunism. We had 
expected a zero effect on the size of ego's loss and a negative effect on the 
probability of loss, but we found a zero effect on probability and a positive 
effect on size. However, inspection of the correlation matrix, found in Table 
3, shows that restraint of alter has a strong positive correlation with ego's 
asset specificity, which, according to Hypothesis 2, has the effect we found 
for restraint of alter. This suggests that restraint of alter's opportunism may 
be taking the place of ego's switching costs (asset specificity). 
The correlation between asset specificity and restraint of alter has an 
important implication: theoretically, according to Hypothesis 1,asset speci- 
TABLE 3 
Correlationsa 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Size of loss 




6. Restriction of room for 
alter's opportunism 
7. Continuity 
8. Asset specificity 
9. Value of alter 
10. Alter's share of sales 
11. Remaining indicators of 
value of alter 
12. Value of ego 
13.Uncertaintyavoidance 
14. Size 



















































































































" N =  97. 
* * p <.Ol 
*** p < .001 
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ficity increases the stake that ego has in a relationship and therefore in- 
creases the size of a loss, but it also contributes to the dependence of the 
partner: by making more specific investments ego offers a unique value to 
alter, which contributes to alter's dependence and thereby reduces his or her 
inclination toward opportunism, which reduces the probability of loss. 
We thus computed the regressions again excluding the restraint of alter's 
opportunism from the equation for size of ego's loss; results are summarized 
in Table 4. 
The results for ego's perceived probability of loss are almost exactly like 
those shown in Table 2. For the size of ego's loss, asset specificity now has 
a significant effect: its coefficient hardly changes but is now highly signifi- 
cant. Another result is that the coefficient of continuity increases and main- 
tains its high level of significance. This finding is consistent with the idea 
TABLE 4 
Results of Regression Analysis with Restraint of Alter Excluded 









HI :  Value of alter 
Alter's share of sales 

















H3: Restriction of room for 
















H7: Restraint of alter Excluded Excluded 














" N = 97. Standardized coefficients are shown, with significance levels in parentheses. 
* p < .05 
* * p < .01 
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that the earlier lack of significance was due to the correlation between asset 
specificity and restraint of alter. 
To test Hypotheses 3a and 3b, 4a and 4b, and 6a and 6b, we investigated 
how the effects were distributed over the component variables, evaluating 
the different aspects of asset specificity, ordering, continuity, and trust. But 
with the enlarged number of explanatory variables, we encountered strong 
multicollinearity. However, we persisted, especially regarding the trust- 
related variables (habitualization and institutionalization), which form the 
main focus of the present study. We thus tested their separate effects on the 
probability of loss in a reduced model with as many variables as possible left 
out to reduce the problem of multicollinearity. We omitted the variables that 
previously (Table 4) were found to be insignificant: those pertaining to the 
value of the partners to each other, asset specificity, and ego's firm size. 
Table 5 gives results. Habitualization had the expected effect, but institu- 
tionalization did not. We noted from the beginning that the two dimensions 
of trust were expected, on theoretical grounds, to be difficult to separate; 
empirically, this difficulty is reflected in their mutual correlation (r= .31, p 
< .002, Table 3). Furthermore, it should be noted that the overall trust vari- 
able includes one item more than the total of its components (see the Ap- 
pendix). This item was kept separate from habitualization and institution- 
alization because it could with equal justification be added to either of them 
(in both cases, Cronbach's alpha increases by more than 10 percentage 
points). This fact also reflects the connectedness of the two dimensions of 
trust. We therefore retained the result with the overall variable (Table 4), but 
we cannot rule out the interpretation that habitualization has a significant 
effect and institutionalization does not. 
Next, we tested for any remaining firm effects. Our hypothesis was that 
firm effects are taken care of by the firm-related variables uncertainty avoid- 
ance and firm size. To test this prediction, we repeated the regression analy- 
ses with dummies for the ten firms whose customer relations we were study- 
ing. To reduce the chance of multicollinearity, we again allowed only for the 
variables that had previously been found to be significant (Table 4). In other 
words, the object was to test whether, in comparison with the last results, the 
addition of firm dummies (1)yielded a significant increase in R2 and (2) did 
not disturb the results on the explanatory variables (Table 4). Table 6 gives 
results. 
Table 6 shows that dummy variables do yield significant effects and that 
they significantly raise R2.We therefore rejected our hypothesis that the two 
firm-specific explanatory variables sufficed to account for firm effects. The 
number of significant dummies is greater for the size of loss than for the 
probability of loss. For probability, one of the firm-specific variables, uncer- 
tainty avoidance, had a significant effect; thus, it accounts for at least part of 
firm variation. For size of loss, neither firm variable was significant. How- 
ever, addition of the dummies did not affect the results concerning the 
systematic (not firm-specific) effects shown in Table 4. On the contrary, the 
size and significance of those effects increased, with the exception of the 
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TABLE 5 











HI:  Value of alter Excluded 
HZ: Asset specificity Excluded 
H3: Restriction of room for alter's opportunism Yes 
H4a: Trust 1: Habitualization Yes 
H4b: Trust 2: Institutionalization 
H5: Value of ego for alter Excluded 
H6: Continuity Yes 
H7: Restraint of alter Excluded 
H8: Uncertainty avoidance 
H9: Firm size Excluded 
RZ 0.37 
Adjusted R' 0.35 
a N = 97.  Standardized coefficients are shown, with significance levels in parentheses. 
* p < .05 
* * p < . O 1  
effect of uncertainty avoidance on the probability of loss (which did, how- 
ever, remain significant). Thus, the omission of the remaining firm effects, 
which are considerable, did not bias the results on the systematic effects. 
Lastly, we further tested the stability of the results by employing step- 
wise regression as an alternative to backward regression. The former yielded 
virtually the same results as the latter. The only difference worth mentioning 
was that fewer firm dummies were included in the end result with the 
stepwise procedure. In the regression equation of the probability of loss, we 
omitted the dummy for firm 1;in the regression of size of loss, we omitted 
the dummies for firms 2 and 4. For the rest, the patterns of significant and 
nonsignificant variables were identical, and differences in regression coef- 
ficients and their significance levels were small. 
DISCUSSION 
The study confirms the idea that relational risk has two dimensions: size 
of loss and probability of loss, each of which has substantially different 
causes. In particular, the central hypothesis (Hypothesis 4) was confirmed: 
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TABLE 6 

Results of Regression Analysis with Dummy Variables for Firms 










HI :  Value of alter 
Alter's share of sales 







HZ: Switching costs Yes 0.26 
(O.Ol)** 
Excluded 
H3: Restriction of room for alter's 
opportunism 
Excluded Yes -0.35 
(O.O)** 
H4a, H4b: Trust Excluded Yes -0.26 
(0.02)* 
H5: Value of ego for alter Excluded Excluded 




H7: Restraint of alter Excluded Excluded 
H8: Uncertainty avoidance Excluded No -0.16 
(0.09)* 
H9: Firm size Excluded Excluded 
Firm dummies 
RL 0.64 0.58 
Adjusted R2 0.61 0.55 
" N = 97. Standardized coefficients are shown, with significance levels in parentheses. 
t p < .10 
* p < .05 

* *  p < .01 

trust, induced by institutionalization and habitualization, has a negative 
effect on risk in the form of the perceived probability of loss. If the two 
components are separated, only habitualization has a significant effect; how- 
ever, the two dimensions are difficult to separate and are perhaps best kept 
together. Perceived probability of loss is further reduced, according to Hy- 
potheses 3a and 3b, by governance in the form of restriction of room for 
opportunism by means of legal and private ordering. As hypothesized (Hy- 
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pothesis 6b), it is also reduced when there is perceived continuity in a 
relationship based on past growth and future perspective. These results can 
be seen as a confirmation of our thesis that both trust and traditional factors 
from transaction cost economics are relevant and that an extended theory of 
transactions applies to relational risk. 
Contrary to Hypotheses 5 and 7 , restraints on a partner's incentives for 
opportunism, in the form of the value that ego offers and other indicators of 
alter's dependence, do not affect the perceived probability of loss. This find- 
ing need not, of course, imply that these variables should not affect that 
perception. Perhaps the suppliers interviewed in the study were not suffi- 
ciently sophisticated to include this indirect evaluation of the dependence of 
their partners as a condition that reduced their own risk. This analysis yields 
a policy implication: in assessing relational risk, one partner should not only 
consider direct effects concerning his or her own dependence, but also in- 
direct effects of the other partner's dependence via restraint on opportunism. 
But note that we also found a significant correlation between asset specific- 
ity and restraint of alter's opportunism. This finding is important, because 
thereby the net effect of specific investments can become ambiguous: asset 
specificity creates vulnerability in terms of the potential size of loss, but it 
can yield protection in the form of a reduced probability of loss. 
We also found that ego's uncertainty avoidance had a negative effect on 
the perceived probability of loss, instead of the positive effect hypothesized 
(Hypothesis 8). This contrary effect has a clear interpretation: rather than 
taking a gloomy look at the perceived risk that remains after taking gover- 
nance measures, as we hypothesized, risk-averse firms tend, more than oth- 
ers, to consider risk sufficiently covered. 
Risk in the form of the size of loss experienced if a relationship goes 
wrong was, as hypothesized, positively affected by the value of the partner 
assessed in terms of the percentage of a focal agent's sales associated with 
that partner, but remaining aspects of partner value had no significant effect. 
Thus, Hypothesis 1is partly confirmed. Switching costs resulting from ded- 
icated and transaction-specific investments (asset specificity) also had the 
hypothesized positive effect on size of loss (Hypothesis 2),  but only after we 
disallowed for an effect of restraint of alter, which is strongly correlated with 
asset specificity. Continuity of a relationship had its hypothesized positive 
effect on the size of loss (Hypothesis 6a). Firm size did not have the hypoth- 
esized negative effect (Hypothesis 9).We do not consider this a final verdict. 
As is often the case, firm size is correlated with many other variables, so its 
effect may be masked. 
Our check on firm-specific effects through dummy variables showed 
that such effects are important but that variables such as uncertainty avoid- 
ance and size do not suffice to cover all firm effects. However, the omission 
of firm dummies did not, in the present study, yield a bias in the measure- 
ment of the systematic effects derived from our extended theory of transac- 
tions. 
As discussed, different contingencies are likely to lead to different con- 
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figurations of governance, so we cannot conclude that the present results 
apply in all cases. The results do show that certain elements of governance 
and trust have the expected effects, at least in this case, and in that sense, 
theory is confirmed. Moreover, we should recall that the study focused on 
intentional trust, not competence trust. 
The present study confirms our earlier finding of a negative effect of 
trust on perceived dependence (Berger et al., 1995), but here we added more 
detail, dividing trust into two dimensions (institutionalization and habitu- 
alization) and dividing the risk of dependence into the size and the prob- 
ability of loss. Of course, these procedures do not eliminate the need to test 
the external validity of the effect of trust on other sets of data. Another 
indication for further research emerges from the result that the incorporation 
of uncertainty avoidance and firm size did not suffice to account for the 
firm-specific effects of perceived risk exhibited by firm dummy variables. 
Furthermore, the constructs that we used to measure the size and probability 
of loss could be expanded to include more items. An important area for 
further research is the development of further hypotheses concerning which 
configurations of governance are expected to be the best under different 
conditions for relationship objectives, payoff structure, market conditions 
(structure of supply and demand), technical conditions (need for specific 
assets, opportunities for monitoring), and cultural conditions (bonding, 
shared norms and values). Such hypotheses should be tested in various 
settings. 
A policy recommendation that can be derived from the study is that 
firms may be well advised to employ more sophistication in their assess- 
ments of relational risk. In particular, firm's agents might take into account 
the restraint that they need and want to exercise in view of their firm's 
dependence, particularly dependence resulting from the value the firm is 
offering to its partner. 
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APPENDIX 

Measurements and Scales 

Dependent Variables 
Size of loss, ego (a = .90) 
Actually, we cannot afford a break with this customer. 
If the relation with this customer breaks, it will take us much effort to fill the gap in  
turnover. 
Probability of loss, ego 
The risk in this relation is sufficiently covered by contractual and noncontractual means. 
Explanatory Variables, Captiveness (Value of Alter) 
Alter's share of sales: percentage of total sales to the buyer (alter) as a cardinal measure of the 
value of alter. 
Remaining indicators of value of alter (a = .70) 
Because we supply to this customer we are able to build up technological know-how that 
is also useful for other customers. 
Because we supply to this customer we obtain market knowledge that would otherwise be 
difficult to access. 
Our firm is involved in an early stage in the development of new components for this 
customer ("early supplier involvement"). 
This customer involves us in the testing of components and/or in prototyping. 
Dedicated assets (a = .83) 
Our firm employs significantly more people than if we did not supply this customer. 
Our firm must have people with specific expertise in-house to be able to supply this 
customer. 
Our firm has had to create extra capacity to supply this customer. 
We had to make investments to satisfy the specific supply conditions of this customer (e.g. 
for "just-in-time"). 
Physical asset specificity (a = .70) 
For our production for this customer highly specific machines, apparatus, or instruments 
are needed. 
Most of the machines, apparatus, or instruments needed for the production for this cus- 
tomer can also be used for other customers, if necessary. 
Knowledge specificity (a = .68) 
We have had to invest much time in acquiring the procedures desired for this customer (e.g., 
in the area of logistics and quality control). 
Much specific technological know-how is required to effectively supply this customer. 
Much knowledge of the internal organization of this customer is required for effective 
cooperation. 
Location specificity 
The location of our firm plays an important role in  the relation with this customer. 
Switching costs, ego = asset specificity of ego (a = .84) = dedicated assets + physical asset 
specificity + knowledge specificity + location specificity. 
Explanatory Variables, Governance 
Legal ordering (a = .79) 
The contract with this customer is as complete as possible. 
The contract forms the core of our relation with this customer. 
In this relation it is not so important to have a good contract. 
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Private ordering (a = .71) 
The customer shares in the payment for specific machines and apparatus that we must 
make for the production for him. 
The customer shares in the payment for the investments in specific tools andlor measure- 
ment apparatus that we must make for the production for him. 

Guarantees are given for minimal custom over an agreed period of time. 

We give guarantees for supply for an agreed period of time. 

Restriction of room for alter's opportunism (a = .79) = legal ordering + private ordering. 
Explanatory Variables, Incentive-Related 
Value of ego (a = .76) 
Our supply performance to this customer cannot be assessed on its merit if one looks only 
at the price. 
This customer is aware that our supply performance cannot be assessed on its merit if one 
looks only at price. 
Our supply to this customer is clearly custom-made. 
We provide an important source of information on new technologies for this customer. 
Our firm is involved in an early stage in the development of new components for this 
customer ("early supplier involvement"). 
This customer involves us in the testing of components andlor in prototyping. 
Growth (a  = .68) 
The relation between our firm and this customer has continually improved in the course of 
time. 
Our supply to this customer has increased strongly in the course of time. 
Future perspective (a = .67) 
In this relation it is assumed that contracts will in general be renewed. 
For the foreseeable future we do not expect a break with this customer. 
We see the relation with this customer as a long-term relation, in which one must invest, 
and in which both sides are willing to make concessions if it is really needed. 
Continuity (a = .78) = growth + future perspective. 
Restraint of alter (a = .80) 
If this customer did not behave fairly with respect to us, he could seriously damage his 
reputation in the market. 
This customer is more dependent on us then we on him. 
This customer cannot afford a break with us. 
If the relation with our firm breaks, the customer will have trouble finding a comparable 
supplier. 

We know much more about the customer than he about us. 

Explanatory Variables, Trust-Related 
Habitualization (a = .75) 
Because we have been doing business so long with this customer, all kinds of procedures 
have become self-evident. 
Because we have been doing business for so long with this customer, we can understand 
each other well and quickly. 
In our contacts with this customer we have never had the feeling of being misled. 
Institutionalization (a  = .87) 
In this relation, both sides are expected not to make demands that can seriously damage the 
interests of the other. 
In this relation the strongest side is expected not to pursue its interest at all costs. 
Habitualization and institutionalization (a= .77)= Habitualization + institutionalization + item: 
In this relation informal agreements have the same significance as formal contracts. (This 
item was kept separate from habitualization and institutionalization because it could 
with equal theoretical and empirical justification be added to either of them: in both cases 
Cronbach's alpha increased by 10 percentage points.) 
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Control Variables 
Uncertainty avoidance, ego (a= .80) :  
In our relations with customers, our firm always tries to cover everything watertight con- 
tractually. 
In the contact with customers we stick to the procedures and rules that apply in our firm. 
We want to prevent becoming too dependent on one or a few large customers. 
In our firm there is a clear preference for risky projects with an opportunity for high profits. 
In view of the nature of our industry it is best to proceed cautiously, and not take too large 
steps. 
With us, decisions are taken fast. 
With us, administrative procedures play an important role. 
Size = ego's annual sales. 
Bart Nooteboom is a professor of management and organization at Groningen Univer- 
sity. He received his Ph.D. degree in economics from Erasmus University. His research 
interests include retailing, small business and entrepreneurship, economies of scale, 
price setting, technology and industrial policy, innovation and diffusion, transaction 
cost theory, subcontracting, alliances, and the methodology and philosophy of econom- 
ics and management. 
Hans Berger is an assistant professor of marketing in the Faculty of Management and 
Organization at Groningen University. He received his master's degree in business 
administration from Groningen University. He is currently engaged in research on 
potential conflicts caused by hierarchical governance mechanisms in vertical interfirm 
relationships. 
Niels G. Noorderhaven is an associate professor of management and a member of the 
Center for Economic Research at Tilburg University and the managing director of the 
Institute for Research on Intercultural Cooperation. He received his Ph.D. degree in 
business administration from Groningen University. His research interests include in- 
terfirm relations, strategic decision making, and comparative management. 
You have printed the following article:
Effects of Trust and Governance on Relational Risk
Bart Nooteboom; Hans Berger; Niels G. Noorderhaven
The Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 40, No. 2, Special Research Forum on Alliances and
Networks. (Apr., 1997), pp. 308-338.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0001-4273%28199704%2940%3A2%3C308%3AEOTAGO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U
This article references the following linked citations. If you are trying to access articles from an
off-campus location, you may be required to first logon via your library web site to access JSTOR. Please
visit your library's website or contact a librarian to learn about options for remote access to JSTOR.
References
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization
Armen A. Alchian; Harold Demsetz
The American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5. (Dec., 1972), pp. 777-795.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28197212%2962%3A5%3C777%3APICAEO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q
Integrating Variable Risk Preferences, Trust, and Transaction Cost Economics
Todd H. Chiles; John F. McMackin
The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 21, No. 1. (Jan., 1996), pp. 73-99.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0363-7425%28199601%2921%3A1%3C73%3AIVRPTA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-O
Reappraising the Eclectic Paradigm in an Age of Alliance Capitalism
John H. Dunning










- Page 1 of 5 -
Agency Problems and Residual Claims
Eugene F. Fama; Michael C. Jensen
Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, No. 2, Corporations and Private Property: A Conference
Sponsored by the Hoover Institution. (Jun., 1983), pp. 327-349.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2186%28198306%2926%3A2%3C327%3AAPARC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-V
Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness
Mark Granovetter
The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 91, No. 3. (Nov., 1985), pp. 481-510.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-9602%28198511%2991%3A3%3C481%3AEAASST%3E2.0.CO%3B2-R
Does Familiarity Breed Trust? The Implications of Repeated Ties for Contractual Choice in
Alliances
Ranjay Gulati
The Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 38, No. 1. (Feb., 1995), pp. 85-112.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0001-4273%28199502%2938%3A1%3C85%3ADFBTTI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q
Understanding the Rationale of Strategic Technology Partnering: Interorganizational Modes
of Cooperation and Sectoral Differences
John Hagedoorn
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 14, No. 5. (Jul., 1993), pp. 371-385.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0143-2095%28199307%2914%3A5%3C371%3AUTROST%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L
The Shadow of the Future: Effects of Anticipated Interaction and Frequency of Contact on
Buyer-Seller Cooperation
Jan B. Heide; Anne S. Miner





- Page 2 of 5 -
A Transaction Costs Theory of Equity Joint Ventures
Jean-Francois Hennart
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 9, No. 4. (Jul. - Aug., 1988), pp. 361-374.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0143-2095%28198807%2F08%299%3A4%3C361%3AATCTOE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23
Cooperation, Opportunism, and the Invisible Hand: Implications for Transaction Cost Theory
Charles W. L. Hill
The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 15, No. 3. (Jul., 1990), pp. 500-513.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0363-7425%28199007%2915%3A3%3C500%3ACOATIH%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F
Against Parsimony: Three Easy Ways of Complicating Some Categories of Economic
Discourse
Albert O. Hirschman
The American Economic Review, Vol. 74, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-Sixth
Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. (May, 1984), pp. 89-96.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28198405%2974%3A2%3C89%3AAPTEWO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4
Measuring Organizational Cultures: A Qualitative and Quantitative Study Across Twenty
Cases
Geert Hofstede; Bram Neuijen; Denise Daval Ohayv; Geert Sanders
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 2. (Jun., 1990), pp. 286-316.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0001-8392%28199006%2935%3A2%3C286%3AMOCAQA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8
Conceptual and Methodological Considerations in the Study of Trust and Suspicion
Herbert W. Kee; Robert E. Knox
The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 14, No. 3. (Sep., 1970), pp. 357-366.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0027%28197009%2914%3A3%3C357%3ACAMCIT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2
An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust
Roger C. Mayer; James H. Davis; F. David Schoorman





- Page 3 of 5 -
Forms of Interorganizational Governance for Multinational Alliances
Richard N. Osborn; C. Christopher Baughn
The Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 33, No. 3. (Sep., 1990), pp. 503-519.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0001-4273%28199009%2933%3A3%3C503%3AFOIGFM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0
Comparative Institutional Economics: The Governance of Rail Freight Contracting
Thomas M. Palay
The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2. (Jun., 1984), pp. 265-287.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0047-2530%28198406%2913%3A2%3C265%3ACIETGO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0
Developmental Processes of Cooperative Interorganizational Relationships
Peter Smith Ring; Andrew H. van de Ven
The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 19, No. 1. (Jan., 1994), pp. 90-118.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0363-7425%28199401%2919%3A1%3C90%3ADPOCIR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P
Role of Individual Attachments in the Dissolution of Interorganizational Relationships
Mark A. Seabright; Daniel A. Levinthal; Mark Fichman
The Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 35, No. 1. (Mar., 1992), pp. 122-160.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0001-4273%28199203%2935%3A1%3C122%3AROIAIT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U
Explaining the Limited Effectiveness of Legalistic "Remedies" for Trust/ Distrust
Sim B. Sitkin; Nancy L. Roth




A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements
L. G. Telser





- Page 4 of 5 -
Profit Centers, Single-Source Suppliers, and Transaction Costs
Gordon Walker; Laura Poppo
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1. (Mar., 1991), pp. 66-87.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0001-8392%28199103%2936%3A1%3C66%3APCSSAT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3
Supplier Competition, Uncertainty, and Make-or-Buy Decisions
Gordon Walker; David Weber
The Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 30, No. 3. (Sep., 1987), pp. 589-596.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0001-4273%28198709%2930%3A3%3C589%3ASCUAMD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2
Reputation and Corporate Strategy: A Review of Recent Theory and Applications
Keith Weigelt; Colin Camerer
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 9, No. 5. (Sep. - Oct., 1988), pp. 443-454.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0143-2095%28198809%2F10%299%3A5%3C443%3ARACSAR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I
Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives
Oliver E. Williamson
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2. (Jun., 1991), pp. 269-296.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0001-8392%28199106%2936%3A2%3C269%3ACEOTAO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q
Trust and Managerial Problem Solving
Dale E. Zand





- Page 5 of 5 -
